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Abstract
  Decision making involves selection from sets of options based on current evidence 
about the state of the world and estimates of the value or utility of different outcomes. 
The neural correlates of evidence assessment that guide simple perceptual judgments 
are now well understood, and we argue that this process can serve as a simple model for 
organizing behavioral and neural correlates of decision making in more complex con-
texts, including those that involve economic transactions, social interaction, emotional 
stimulation, and conscious awareness. Bridging the methodological and theoretical gaps 
between simple and more complicated decision problems remains a fundamental, but in 
our view soluble, challenge for understanding the   neurobiology of decision making.
Introduction
Over the past ten years, neurobiologists have made signiﬁ  cant advances in the 
understanding of the neural correlates of decision making. Given the nature 
of this problem, it is perhaps not surprising that the most signiﬁ  cant progress 
has been achieved in understanding the neuronal mechanisms underlying   per-
ceptual decision making, in which there is a satisfying match between compu-
tational models of behavior and the response properties of single neurons in 
cortical areas traditionally associated with sensorimotor processing. Building 
on this work, we have begun to achieve an understanding of the contribution 
of valuation to this process as well as the neural systems that contribute to 
learning and applying value to decisions. The extension of this work to social 
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interaction, the role of   emotions in coloring or modulating the decision pro-
cess, and the contributions of conscious and nonconscious processes to deci-
sion making remain deeply important yet relatively immature ﬁ  elds of inquiry. 
We predict that important insights can be gained by comparing the principles 
governing decision processing in diverse animals, like humans and honeybees, 
which highlight divergent neural architecture. In our report, we outline cur-
rent understanding of these issues, highlight signiﬁ  cant controversies, and pose 
questions to stimulate new avenues for research. 
What Is a Decision?
Before delving into the neuronal correlates of   decision making, let us deﬁ  ne 
what we mean by a decision: A decision is a commitment to a   choice or course 
of action selected from more than one option. We start by considering percep-
tual decision making, which involves committing to one of a number of propo-
sitions about an aspect of the state of the outside world. Such commitment is 
meant to imply a conversion from an uncommitted state, in which evidence 
and other factors are considered in relation to all the alternatives, to a state in 
which one of the alternatives is chosen. Later we will discuss more general 
decisions, which are typically more divorced from propositions about the state 
of the world. Viewed as a process, a decision has a beginning and an end, and 
it evolves over time.   Commitment implies   termination of the decision process, 
but it does not imply that a decision cannot be superseded or reversed.
Often, a decision results in an action. If that action is immediate, then the 
process reveals its time of termination. If there is no explicit action, or if the 
action is delayed, then there is still a termination, but there is no (obvious) 
behavioral manifestation. There is good evidence that a single mechanism ac-
counts for termination and   choice selection; that is, both when and what is 
decided (reviewed in   Gold and Shadlen 2007). A commitment need not result 
in an action (immediate or planned) but can instead lead to a choice of strategy 
or choice to make a new decision about something else or a commitment to 
implement a complex rule or program (e.g., if told “S1,” reply “A1”; else if 
told “S2”, reply “A2”; else wait). It is useful to expand the concept of “choice 
of action” to incorporate this broader class of decision outcomes.
The key elements of a perceptual decision among N alternatives include:
Identiﬁ  cation of alternatives. These are commonly regarded as hypotheses 
or   beliefs about the world. They are ultimately true or false, although this 
may not be revealed to the decision maker, and are denoted h1,h2,…
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Identiﬁ  cation of actions: For perceptual decisions, in the general sense de-
veloped above, the actions deﬁ  ne the states associated with commitment 
to each of the alternatives: H1, H2,…1
  Evidence is an item of information that has bearing on the alternatives: 
Peh ij () . Evidence can originate from a variety of sources and can arrive 
as a stream in time or all at once.
Priors are knowledge about the likelihood of each of the alternatives, ab-
sent any evidence; that is, the probability  Ph i ()  that each of the alterna-
tives is true, before receipt of any evidence.
  Value and   utilities are the consequences of a decision associated with the 
possible outcomes: uH h ij , () . Notice that the outcomes include both the 
actual state of the world and the action of the decision maker. Utilities are 
based on values and costs, are inﬂ  uenced by motivational and emotional 
factors, and may be accumulated across sequential choices to deﬁ  ne the 
utility or value of a strategy.
  Decision variable is a number (or vector of numbers) that combines the 
preceding terms. An operation on the decision variable establishes the out-
come of the decision.
Decision rule is often a criterion of the decision variable or a bound to 
accumulated evidence.
Objectives and goals are desired consequences of making decisions. They 
are usually stated in terms of values, utility, and time.
  Policy and strategy are operations on control factors (e.g., criteria, deci-
sion variable, utility) that inﬂ  uence the decision process to obtain objec-
tives and goals.
Many decisions are not described as choices among discrete alternatives but 
involve instead an estimate of a quantity or a parameter. For example, instead 
of deciding whether motion is left, right, up, or down, an observer might be 
asked to judge its actual direction of movement. It is an open question how 
and whether the mechanisms of decisions among discrete alternatives can be 
applied to this problem. In statistical contexts, hypothesis testing and param-
eter estimation are types of inference. Commitment implies termination of the 
decision process, but it does not imply that a decision cannot be superseded or 
reversed.
An alternative perspective that is common in statistical treatments is to sep-
arate the hypotheses and actions a little more distinctly. In this case, choices 
are not treated purely as commitment to hypotheses, but rather as independent 
1  It is important to respect the distinction between hypotheses and actions. P(h) refers to the 
probability that a state of the world holds. It also represents the degree of belief in that state. 
P(H) refers to the probability that the decision maker will choose a particular outcome. It is not 
a term that is commonly used, but it could be if the mapping between hypothesis and action 
were complicated.
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entities in their own right. Further, the state of the world is often considered as 
being well known, in which case it is only the utilities that are important for 
determining choices. This encourages a ﬁ  rm functional (though not necessarily 
an algorithmic or implementational) separation between compiling informa-
tion about the   posterior distribution over the states of world based on the evi-
dence,  Phe i () , and the choice of action as maximizing the expected short- or 
long-run utility averaging over this posterior. Later, we consider cases in which 
the state of the world is considered as being well known, where it is only the 
utilities that are important for determining choices.
Drift-diffusion Models of Perceptual Decision Making
  The neuronal correlates of   perceptual decision making have been explored ex-
tensively in association cortical areas that intervene between sensory process-
ing and motor affordance (  Gold and Shadlen 2007;   Sugrue et al. 2004;   Smith 
and Ratcliff 2004;   Glimcher 2003;   Romo and   Salinas 2003). These studies 
have revealed a number of important features of the decision process. Speciﬁ  -
cally, the decision process unfolds in time as the output system is continuously 
fed sensory information that supports a particular motor affordance. For ex-
ample, the   lateral intraparietal area (LIP) contributes to the selection of a target 
for an orienting movement of the eyes. Neurons in this area continuously query 
sensory areas for information supporting a particular orienting movement. The 
value or utility of a particular orienting saccade inﬂ  uences this temporally ex-
tended process (Platt and   Glimcher 1999;   Sugrue et al. 2004).
The temporal unfolding of activity in neurons in the LIP (Shadlen and   New-
some 2001;   Roitman and Shadlen 2002;   Huk and Shadlen 2005) as well as 
other areas, such as the frontal eye ﬁ  elds (  Roesch and   Olson 2003;   Ding and 
  Hikosaka 2006), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (  Kim and Shadlen 1999; 
  Heekeren et al. 2004), premotor cortex (  Romo et al. 2004), and superior col-
liculus (  Horwitz and   Newsome 2001), has been argued to represent a decision 
variable. Furthermore, the decision variable has been argued to resemble dif-
fusion to boundary models developed to explain choice and reaction time data 
in psychophysical studies (Ratcliff 1978; Ratcliff et al. 2003). In these models, 
the decision variable has a starting point, a drift rate or rate of accumulation, 
and a terminal boundary representing the end of the decision process. Accord-
ing to this view, neurons represent a decision variable that integrates sensory 
information favoring a particular oculomotor response until the boundary is 
crossed, after which a movement is initiated. Remarkably, models of this sort 
can explain a large fraction of the variance in both choice and reaction time 
based on the spike rates of neurons in many of these areas (  Mazurek et al. 
2003; Ratcliff et al. 2003).
Complementing the prediction of behavioral data from neuronal activ-
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behavioral data with a diffusion class model and predict neuronal ﬁ  ring rates 
(Ratcliff et al. 2003). Speciﬁ  cally, in a simple   brightness discrimination task, 
a dual diffusion model was ﬁ  t to behavioral data, accuracy, and correct and 
error reaction time distributions. Then, position in the process was assumed 
to represent ﬁ  ring rate, and functions predicting ﬁ  ring rate were able to match 
most of the main features of the observed ﬁ  ring rate data quantitatively. This 
correspondence between behavioral models and neurophysiological data are 
startling, to say the least, given the history of compartmentalization in much 
of science.
The consilience of the psychophysical model and neurophysiological data 
thus represents a major success in understanding the   neurobiology of decision 
making. This model has been extended to the neuronal correlates of somato-
sensory guided decisions (  Romo and   Salinas 2003), behavioral and imaging 
data from human subjects performing numerical judgment tasks (Dehaene 
2007;   Sigman and Dehaene 2005) and object classiﬁ  cation tasks (  Heekeren et 
al. 2004). Moreover, similar processes seem likely to underlie decisions about 
a choice of strategy so the model is not limited to overt actions. For instance, 
in a dual-task setting, where subjects have to perform quickly, in the order they 
prefer, a visual numerical judgment and an auditory tone judgment, choosing 
which of two tasks to perform ﬁ  rst adds a stage to the response time which can 
be modeled as involving a noisy accumulation of evidence up to a threshold 
(Sigman and Dehaene 2006). It might even be possible to extend these ideas 
to more complex real-life decisions, as when children select which algorithm 
(e.g., memory retrieval, explicit calculation, shortcut) to apply to an arithmetic 
problem, a high-level decision that has been modeled as a differential weighing 
of evidence for the efﬁ  ciency of the various alternatives (  Siegler 1988).
The model also has the attractive feature that conﬁ  dence in the decision 
could, in principle, be estimated from the length of time needed to commit 
to a response or information encapsulated in integrators that fail to reach the 
boundary for commitment. We note, however, that thus far computational 
modeling of psychophysical data does not support the idea that observers use 
elapsed time as an estimate of uncertainty.
Despite these advances, signiﬁ  cant controversies remain. Do all decisions 
evolve in time? Although it would appear that every decision takes time, it re-
mains unclear as to how the decision process unfolds when there is no relevant 
sensory information to guide choice. Further, can the model account for deci-
sions extended across long periods of time and involving multiple sources of 
information, such as choosing whether or not to buy a car? Likewise, decision 
making at the institutional level may not always involve the extended transmis-
sion of evidence. Conversely, legal decision making often involves backward 
contingency of evidence that alters the decision process.
A second set of questions focuses on whether decisions of this type are 
more appropriately modeled using nonlinear system dynamics (cf.   Wang 2002; 
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the perceptual model of decision making extended in time represents a set 
of formal, quantitative principles for organizing neurophysiological (and per-
haps neuroimaging) evidence gathered in other decision-making contexts, in-
cluding those that unfold over long periods of time, emotional situations, and 
social interaction.
The Origins of Variability in Decision Making
Psychological Models
  One important feature of decision models in psychology is that they assume 
different sources of noise during processing. There is noise within the decision 
process, noise in the evidence entering the process from trial to trial, and noise 
in the decision criteria (or starting point of the process, which is to a large 
degree equivalent). We would like to emphasize two main points: First, these 
sources of noise are discriminable in the models. Simulated data can be gener-
ated from the model with different values of these noise parameters and these 
can be recovered. Second, these sources of noise are necessary to ﬁ  t behavioral 
data. A diffusion process with equal boundaries predicts that reaction times on 
correct and error trials are identical. For example, variability in   evidence (drift 
rate) from trial to trial leads to errors slower than correct responses and vari-
ability in decision criteria from trial to trial gives fast errors.
Noise and Randomness in Decision Making
Most decisions   of interest from a psychological, economic, or evolutionary 
point of view appear stochastic. In part, this is because evidence and/or valua-
tion does not uniquely guarantee only one optimal choice. Moreover, the neu-
ronal correlates of the assumed decision variable can only be revealed when 
there is incomplete agreement between information and choice. For these 
reasons, psychological and neurobiological research has focused on decisions 
based on evidence and/or valuation that tends to favor, but does not determine, 
one choice. In these situations, knowledge of the variables inﬂ  uencing choice 
appears to govern the probability of an outcome without guaranteeing it. Thus, 
the actual choice appears to be random.
There are two qualitatively different classes of mechanisms which could 
give rise to   probabilistic behavior (Shadlen et al., this volume;   Luce and   Sup-
pes 1965). The difference between these two mechanisms is whether the noise 
is in the assessment of evidence and utilities (ﬁ  rst stage) or in the application 
of the decision rule (second stage). If it is in the ﬁ  rst stage, then the decision 
arises deterministically based on the sign of a noisy decision variable relative 
to a criterion. In this case, variability arises because the representation of evi-
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similar to the random utility model of   Manski (1977), which assumes that the 
decision rule is applied deterministically.  This model implies that individual 
preferences or utilities will not always be the same under identical conditions 
because of measurement error and random variation in the assessment of pref-
erence or utility.   Utilities are thus conceptualized as random variables.
If the noise is in the second stage, the decision process uses errorless rep-
resentations of the utility of options to compute a probability of choice and 
realizes it in an explicitly random act, equivalent to ﬂ  ipping a weighted coin 
(  Glimcher 2005). This model is similar to the constant utility theory of   Luce 
(1959), which states that choice is a probabilistic function of preferences or 
utilities (  Luce 1959). Thus, accordingly, utilities can be deduced from the rela-
tive frequency with which an individual chooses various alternatives under 
identical conditions. 
These two models of probabilistic behavior cannot be distinguished behav-
iorally. An animal that chooses “right” on 71% of trials could be choosing 
“right” every time the value of a normally distributed variable with μσ == 1 
exceeds 0, or it could be doing so by ﬂ  ipping a weighted coin on each trial 
(p = 0.71). For well-studied perceptual decisions, the ﬁ  rst idea has strong sup-
port (see   Gold and Shadlen 2007). Enthusiasm for the deliberate random act 
derives mainly from theoretical claims that randomness confers survival ad-
vantage in predator–prey situations and competitive games (  Glimcher 2005; 
  Maynard Smith 1982).
Neuronal Noise and Decision Making
In perceptual decisions, variability in choice and response time can be traced to 
the variable activity of neurons in the cortex (for a review, see   Parker and   New-
some 1998;   Mazurek and Shadlen 2003). Recordings from the neurons that 
represent evidence and the neurons that represent the   decision variable show 
trial-to-trial variation in spike rates which explains (a) the behavioral sensitiv-
ity overall, (b) errors on single trials, and (c) some of the variance in reaction 
time. This implies strongly that although, in principle, behavioral variability 
could have a variety of causes—including the representation of states that are 
simply unknown to the experimenter or irrelevant to the task at hand—the brain 
is unable to eliminate these causes. It is affected by variability in the way that 
conforms to the noise in the engineering sense, and this leads to mistakes.
What is the source of the neural noise? This is an immense topic beyond 
the scope of our report. We note, however, that there is clear and compel-
ling empirical evidence that cortical neurons discharge irregularly (Shadlen 
and   Newsome 1994, 1998). This implies that every quantity that the neocortex 
represents—be it evidence, a decision variable, or a representation of elapsed 
time—is corrupted in some sense by response variability, and thus includes 
both signal and noise. Although noise may be an intrinsic feature of the bio-
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exclude the possibility that intrinsic neuronal noise has been exploited by evo-
lution to promote behavioral variability or ﬂ  exibility, which can have obvious 
survival advantages (  Glimcher 2005).
Value-based Decision Making
  As noted, decisions involve selecting among possibilities based partly on their 
value or utility. We can deﬁ  ne the   value of a state as the expected long-run 
summed reward, discounted by the delay to its receipt, starting from that state; 
the value of an action at a state (sometimes called a Q value) can be deﬁ  ned as 
the expected long-run summed reward starting from initiating that particular 
action when in that state, again discounted by delay. From a formal perspec-
tive, it is appropriate to consider net rewards after costs are taken into account, 
although the neural realization of costs and punishments is less clear than that 
for rewards.
As mentioned, much of the work on perceptual decision making has fo-
cused on uncertainty about the state of the world and the decision variables that 
accumulate sensory information favoring one state over another. In contrast, 
the tradition of studies investigating complex, long-run values has tended to 
assume that states are well known, thus placing the emphasis squarely on the 
utilities. This tradition is the focus of our discussion for the remainder of this 
section. However, two important caveats point to the future merging of these 
approaches: First, although the state of the subject in the world may be known, 
the rules of the world (e.g., what transitions between states are occasioned by 
which actions) are not. In this case, subjects face an exploration–exploitation 
dilemma associated with their uncertainty about the nature of the environment. 
Although not generally couched in such terms, this implies that there exist 
some higher-order decision variables that control the course of exploration. 
Second, value-based decision making still requires a physical realization of 
competition among the options. This likely involves the same sort of mecha-
nisms as discussed for perceptual decision making, and it may be possible to 
endow the variables coded by neural ﬁ  ring rates in the competing populations 
with some form of decision variable semantics.
Value Systems
  Consideration of the psychological and neural data suggests that value thus 
deﬁ  ned is not a unitary concept: there are different ways of deﬁ  ning and calcu-
lating value, and there are different ways of using values to control decisions. 
These different notions of value also appear to map onto somewhat distinct 
neural systems. Available data suggest the existence of four different systems 
for computing and representing value, although there is by no means consensus 
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The ﬁ  rst value system is the   native value system. Native values are inﬂ  u-
enced by motivational states (e.g., hunger, thirst) and (probably) mood. 
Thus, native values may differ from true, real-world values. This system 
has been described as the “  liking” system (  Berridge and   Robinson 2003) 
and is most likely mediated by the primary taste system,   hypothalamus, 
and periaqueductal gray region of the   brainstem and can be modulated by 
opioids and   benzodiazepines.
The second value system is the   forward model system. This system learns 
a full tree of states, actions, transitions, and outcomes, and it infers values 
by extensive search of this tree. Since the forward model’s evaluation of 
the outcomes it encounters during this search appears to be sensitive to 
motivational state, it is goal directed. This model of value is computation-
ally hard to compute and is probably the best candidate to be considered 
as an explicit value system. The neural systems associated with outcome 
evaluation in the forward model remain a subject of debate, but may be 
related to physiological evaluation mechanisms (discussed further below). 
The inference process appears to involve the   dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex as well as the dorsomedial   striatum and places a heavy burden on 
working memory.
The   cached value system represents the learned value of a state or an ac-
tion, which is typically independent of motivational state or changes in 
the environment. Thus, the cached value system is inﬂ  exible and cannot 
generalize to different motivational states or contexts. The normal form of 
learning uses   dopamine to report an appetitive prediction error, with val-
ues being represented in the amygdala and possibly the ventral striatum. 
It has been speculated that serotonin calculates cached values for aversive 
outcomes (  Daw et al. 2002).
The fourth value system computes the   long-run expected value, which 
putatively acts as an opportunity cost of inaction and controls the vigor of 
responding. This value system is important for determining when to act 
and may be linked to tonic dopamine levels (  Niv et al. 2006).
Value-based Control Systems
  These four value systems contribute in a variety of ways to four different sys-
tems controlling decision making:
  Goal-directed   control follows from state-action values computed by the 
forward model. Since choices are based on extensive search of all states, 
actions, and outcomes, goal-directed decision making provides a sophisti-
cated, but computationally expensive, control system.
  Habitual control operates on cached state-action values. Because cached 
values are insensitive to motivational state, habit-based control is inﬂ  exible. 
1.
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  Habitual control depends strongly on the dorsolateral striatum and is inﬂ  u-
enced by the neuromodulators,   dopamine, and   serotonin.
These two control systems are conventionally assumed to compete through a 
softmax function (essentially rolling dice) according to their relative uncer-
tainties, although the mechanisms that compute uncertainty remain unclear. 
  Competition within each system could possibly be implemented instead by a 
diffusion-to-bound mechanism, similar to the one proposed to account for per-
ceptual decision making (Shadlen et al., this volume;   Gold and Shadlen 2007).
The long-run expected value inﬂ  uences action latency.
The   episodic controller can best be viewed as a replacement for the for-
ward model because it is more accurate in very early learning. This system 
simply recommends repeating any action or sequence of actions that was 
successful in the past, a strategy that can be shown to be optimal (i.e., to 
have minimal uncertainty) in some particular circumstances. The hippo-
campus likely plays a key role in episodic control.
The   Pavlovian controller speciﬁ  es actions regardless of their instrumental 
suitability. This control system consists of intrinsic, instinctive mecha-
nisms that have been programmed by evolution due to their routine ef-
ﬁ  cacy. Pavlovian control includes spontaneous approach and avoidance 
behaviors in the light of value-based predictions of reward, and thus leads 
to behavioral phenomena such as autoshaping, negative automaintenance, 
and Pavlovian-instrumental transfer. Preparatory appetitive and aversive 
effects appear to depend on the ventral striatum, whereas more consum-
matory defensive and aggressive Pavlovian responses appear to depend on 
the dorsal periaqueductal gray region of the brainstem.
These four value systems and associated decision control systems can account 
for a wide array of observations following speciﬁ  c manipulations (e.g., such as 
incentive devaluation) as well as damage to speciﬁ  c brain areas (e.g., the dor-
solateral striatum), and these promote particular behavioral responses. There 
are, however, other conceptualizations of value and control systems that might 
equally account for these observations. This caveat becomes clear when we 
consider precisely how a single decision evolves in time within and across 
these systems. Speciﬁ  cally, how can evidence for these four systems be recon-
ciled with neurophysiological observations of integration with respect to time 
in perceptual decision making? Do the resultant values computed in each of 
these four systems contribute to the decision variable apparently computed in 
cortical areas mediating sensorimotor processing? If so, how do they inﬂ  uence 
the   decision variables? It is not yet clear precisely how competition between 
decisions is instantiated (i.e., whether decision variables are parsimoniously 
seen as being involved) and what inﬂ  uence uncertainty has on states (as in 
perceptual decision making). For instance, there is evidence for value-related 
bias of the decision variable (Platt and   Glimcher 1999;   Sugrue et al. 2004; 
3.
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Klein et al., in prep.) as well as motivationally induced changes in the rate of 
integration (  Bendiksby and Platt 2006) of neurons in the   LIP. Certainly, the 
mechanisms underlying value-related inﬂ  uences on the decision variable, as 
well as precisely where value-related signals enter the decision process, remain 
to be explicated fully, thus providing a fruitful avenue for future research.
The Role of Emotion in Decision Making
Value and Emotion
  As discussed above, the concept of value is fundamental to current models of 
decision making. When considering the impact of emotion on decision mak-
ing, one might begin by considering the relation between value and emotion.
Current models do not limit emotion to a subjective feeling. There is no 
question that many of us make choices when we do not have strong feelings. 
One does not need to have a strong subjective experience to invoke an emo-
tional process (  LeDoux 1996). The distinction between feeling and emotion is 
prominent in current models of emotion, but it is less familiar to those from 
other disciplines and can thus result in some confusion. 
What distinguishes value from emotion? The answer to this depends on 
how we understand the purpose and limits of emotion. It is has been argued 
by some that emotion is a relevance detector in that it allows us to determine 
what is or is not important in a given situation, in order to generate an adaptive 
response (  Cosmides and   Tooby 2000). In this broad framework, we can clearly 
see the intersection of emotion and value. Although emotion may encompass 
more than value, value is a fundamental component of emotion. However, oth-
ers have argued that systems that mediate emotion as well as those that do not 
both contribute to the calculation of value (  Cohen 2005). Accordingly, emo-
tion and value are clearly related, but remain distinct. This latter view is more 
prominent in current models of decision making.
What Is Emotion?
Prior to considering the role of   emotion in decision making, it is necessary 
to deﬁ  ne precisely what we mean by the term “emotion.” Emotion is often 
discussed as a unitary concept in the decision-making literature, but there are 
clearly a number of components that should be differentiated if we are to un-
derstand the range of means by which it might impact our choices. How to 
best characterize the components or dimensions of   emotion has been widely 
debated by psychologists and philosophers, and there is no clear agreement. As 
a working framework, we will refer to   Scherer’s (2000) model of emotion.
In Scherer’s model, emotion refers to synchronized responses, which may 
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action tendencies, that are triggered by internal or external events and which 
are of signiﬁ  cance to the organism. Mood reﬂ  ects a more diffuse, long-lasting, 
and likely less intense state and is characterized primarily by a change in sub-
jective feeling.   Attitudes are relatively enduring, affectively colored   beliefs, 
preferences, and predispositions toward objects or persons. Personality traits 
are emotionally laden, stable dispositions, and behavioral tendencies typical 
for a person.
These four distinctions represent classes of states one might include under 
the term “emotion.” Within each class, one might further differentiate spe-
ciﬁ  c types of responses or states, such as fear, happiness, sadness, or social 
emotions (e.g., guilt). Another common distinction in emotion research is to 
characterize reactions or states with dimensions, such as valence (i.e., positive 
or negative) and arousal (intensity). As this framework makes clear, the term 
“emotion” is often used to represent a class of processes, each of which might 
have a unique impact on decision making.
Current Models of Emotion and Decision Making
Dual Selves Models 
  One of the main ways that the impact of emotion on decision making has been 
characterized is to view emotion and cognition as two alternative means by 
which we can arrive at a choice. The notion that we can make choices with ei-
ther our heart (emotion) or our head (reason) was ﬁ  rst proposed in early philo-
sophical writings, and this distinction persists to this day in common language 
use, legal reasoning, as well as scientiﬁ  c investigations. A primary contention 
of this dual selves approach is that emotion and reason compete with one an-
other when arriving at a decision.
As the popularity of the dual selves model suggests, there is clearly some in-
tuitive appeal in viewing decision making this way. However, there are also nu-
merous problems which lead us to suggest that the model is simply too simplis-
tic, as well as unrealistic, to capture the role of emotion in decision making.
For example, one function of emotion is to allow us to interact adaptively 
with our environment, thus avoiding situations that are dangerous or threaten-
ing and moving us toward choices that are likely to increase evolutionary ﬁ  t-
ness. Emotion plays an important role in the assignment of value. In this way, 
emotion is a critical component of models of decision making.
Another primary difﬁ  culty with the dual selves model is that it suggests a 
unitary role for emotion in decision making. As discussed below, there are sev-
eral means by which different components of emotion can inﬂ  uence decisions, 
and no single characterization will sufﬁ  ce. Although one might argue that 
under some circumstances an emotional reaction might interfere with one’s 
ability to reason about a decision, there are also several other ways that emo-
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are integrated into the “rational” decision-making process has yet to be fully 
understood. There is, however, abundant evidence to suggest that the relation 
between emotion and reason in decision making is not simply competitive.
Somatic Marker Hypothesis
One model for emotion’s role in decision making that has received consider-
able attention is the   somatic marker hypothesis (  Damasio 1996). Damasio and 
his collaborator Antoine Bechara suggest that emotion can provide a heuristic 
for decision making by associating physiological bodily reactions, called so-
matic markers, with speciﬁ  c choices or options (  Bechara and Damasio 2005). 
When faced with a decision, the somatic marker allows one to assess the poten-
tial emotional consequences of a possible option without having to use reason. 
In this way, emotion provides a shortcut for fast, intuitive decisions and does 
not depend on deliberative assessment or awareness of potential outcomes. It is 
suggested that the   ventral medial prefrontal cortex and the insular cortex play 
critical roles in representing somatic markers.
Although it is likely that physiological emotional reactions—and their 
learned associations with objects, persons, or potential outcomes—play an im-
portant role in decision making, there are several aspects of the somatic marker 
hypothesis that have not been supported by the data.
One problem relates to how the physiological response is mapped onto a 
particular choice. In the initial   Bechara   gambling task (Bechara et al. 1994), 
it was proposed that when considering a possible option, an increased physi-
ological response (i.e., somatic marker) causes one to move away from that 
option (which is riskier and, ultimately, less rewarding) toward another that 
does not invoke as strong an emotional response. However, simply changing 
the order or outcomes of the possible options has been shown to lead to the 
opposite result; that is, a stronger physiological response for the preferred op-
tion (  Tomb et al. 2002). In other words, somatic markers do not predict the 
appropriate action.
In addition, a dissociation between the physiological response and choice 
has been demonstrated in a number of studies. Patients who do not have a 
normal representation of bodily states perform normally on the Iowa gambling 
task used in the initial Bechara studies (  Bechara et al. 1994). In addition, lesion 
evidence in rats suggests that the neural circuits mediating the physiological 
response to a conditioned fear stimulus are partially distinct from those mediat-
ing the decision to avoid the conditioned stimulus (  Amorapanth et al. 2000).
Components of Emotion and Decisions
  In spite of difﬁ  culties with some of the strong claims of the somatic marker 
hypothesis, one of the advances of this approach is that it considers the inde-
pendent contribution of a speciﬁ  c component of emotion: the physiological 138  M. Platt et al. 
response. This component approach has been extended in recent work by Le-
rner and colleagues (  Lerner and   Keltner 2001).
There is evidence, for example, that distinct emotional reactions, each of 
which leads to a similar physiological response and bodily state, can have the 
opposite effects on decision making. Despite years of investigation, research-
ers have been unable to detect clear differences in the physiological responses 
that characterize discrete emotional states, such as anger and fear. For this 
reason, and others, emotion researchers have suggested that an appraisal of the 
situation is an important component of the subjective qualities of an emotional 
response.  Lerner and Keltner (2001) suggest that anger and fear, which elicit 
a similar physiological proﬁ  le, can have opposite effects on the assessment of 
risk in decision making. Anger, along with happiness, results in less   risk aver-
sion, whereas fear leads to increased risk aversion. This effect was observed 
both when assessing anger and fear as personality traits and when experimen-
tally manipulating mood. Lerner and   Keltner (2001) suggest that this reﬂ  ects 
differences in the cognitive sense of certainty and control between anger and 
fear. An alternative interpretation is that anger and fear promote different ac-
tion tendencies (i.e., approach and avoid). In either case, it is clear that the 
physiological state alone cannot determine emotion’s inﬂ  uence on the assess-
ment of risk. In a related series of studies,   Lerner and   Lowenstein (2003) dem-
onstrated that the induction of a sad or disgusted mood differentially inﬂ  uences 
the endowment effect, with a sad mood essentially reversing the endowment 
effect and a disgusted mood simply eliminating it.
Proposed Framework for Future Investigations 
of Emotion and Decision Making
  As the studies by Lerner and colleagues cited above demonstrate, examination 
of the components of emotion reveals a range of effects on decision making, 
including opposite patterns depending on the speciﬁ  c emotional state. To date, 
much of the research on emotion and decision making has been rather impre-
cise in deﬁ  ning the speciﬁ  c aspects of emotion that are important. Given the 
range of processes and functions encompassed by the term emotion, future 
research on the neural mechanisms of emotion and decision making would 
beneﬁ  t from a more precise characterization and assessment of emotion and its 
impact on speciﬁ  c aspects of decision making.
In addition, it is clear that decision making can also impact emotion. For 
instance, one can choose to engage in a cognitive strategy to regulate one’s 
emotional state (i.e., the glass is half full). This choice may not only inﬂ  uence 
emotional reactions, but also subsequent decisions made while in this state. In 
addition, choosing an option can represent an investment in that option, which 
in turn can change its perceived value. Through processes such as cognitive 
dissonance, social psychologists have identiﬁ  ed a range of means by which 
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complex interactions of emotion and decision making, and the relation to val-
ue, is an important challenge for the future.
Finally, we suggest that an initial approach to understanding the mecha-
nisms of emotion and decision making might be to link speciﬁ  c components 
of emotion to aspects of existing models of decision making. For instance, 
we suggest that speciﬁ  c emotional states and reactions elicit action tenden-
cies, such as fear and withdrawal or anger and approach. In the context of the 
particular model of value-based decision making discussed above, these ac-
tion tendencies are likely reﬂ  ected in the motivational state in the   native value 
system and   forward model system (Dayan, this volume). Similarly, one might 
incorporate the impact of physiological arousal in the assessment of outcomes 
in this model or take advantage of a detailed description of emotion to further 
characterize components of the value-based model, such as behavioral vigor or 
the   Pavlovian controller.
We have provided examples from only one model, but it is the approach that 
we wish to emphasize here. Although there are components of the mechanisms 
of emotion that are clearly distinct from those of decision making, there are 
likely several levels of integration. By emphasizing the integration of models 
of emotion and decision making in future research, we can avoid the implica-
tions of the intuitively appealing, but inaccurate, dual selves models which 
have dominated both the layperson’s perceptions and research on emotion and 
decision making.
Conscious and Subliminal Decision Making
Deﬁ  ning and Measuring Conscious and   Unconscious Processing 
  Descriptions of valuation and   decision-making systems at the functional and 
neurophysiological levels often remain agnostic about whether these process-
es occur at a conscious or   nonconscious level. To address this, we must ﬁ  nd 
minimally different conditions in which availability of conscious information 
varies, measure the extent to which information is processed consciously and 
nonconsciously, and provide a means for measuring the inﬂ  uence of these pro-
cesses on valuation and decision making (Dehaene, this volume).
There are, in fact, many ways to study the conscious/nonconscious contrast 
(e.g.,   blindsight, forgetting, hemi-neglect,   masking,   attentional blink). Typi-
cally, one compares two conditions that are as minimally different as possible, 
yet promote either conscious or nonconscious processing; for instance, a word 
followed by a mask (  Kouider and Dehaene 2007). Asserting whether process-
ing is or is not conscious, however, can be difﬁ  cult. The key feature of con-
scious processing is the subjective awareness of an event. This is usually as-
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“commentary” on the event. However, when a subject is unable to report, there 
is no universal agreement that this indicates a lack of subjective awareness.
Nonetheless, reportability seems to be an excellent index of a major transi-
tion occurring in the availability of information for many tasks. For example, 
masking tasks require subjects to perform a discrimination as well as provide a 
verbal report about a stimulus followed by a mask. The delays between stimu-
lus and mask determine reportability as well as discrimination performance on 
this task. Although subjects often perform better than chance when the stimu-
lus remains subliminal, objective performance measures and subjective report-
ability share a similar threshold: a value of the delay beyond which stimulus 
information is available for discrimination, report, or, in fact, essentially any 
task (  Del Cul et al. 2007).
Inﬂ  uence of Conscious and Subliminal Processing on Decision Making
Neurobiological evidence suggests that nonconscious events can inﬂ  uence the 
decision processes that integrate evidence favoring a particular motor response, 
as outlined above. For example,   subliminal priming can evoke biased activa-
tion in motor structures associated with the behavioral report (Dehaene et al. 
1998). Furthermore, changes in reaction time associated with subliminal pro-
cessing can be explained by partial accumulation of evidence provided by the 
prime (e.g.,   Vorberg et al. 2003). These observations suggest that the temporal 
accumulation of sensory evidence can operate without conscious processing. 
Importantly, this can occur at a fairly high level of processing since sublimi-
nal primes can be processed in terms of their semantic content (Dehaene et 
al. 1998) or motivational value (  Pessiglione et al. 2007). Recently, subliminal 
cues have even been found to inﬂ  uence executive-level processing such as task 
switching (  Lau and   Passingham 2007).
Despite the importance of nonconscious processing for decision making, 
items or events that enter awareness can differentially inﬂ  uence the decision 
process. Numerous differences between subliminal and conscious-level pro-
cessing have been proposed (Dehaene and   Naccache 2001). Subliminal primes 
typically have only a minimal subthreshold inﬂ  uence on behavior, altering 
task-related choices by a few tens of milliseconds and error rates by a few per-
cent. This is compatible with the hypothesis that many if not all of the brain’s 
  evidence accumulation systems can begin to operate nonconsciously; however, 
it also suggests that crossing the threshold for a full-blown decision is often, 
if not always, associated with conscious-level processing. Usually, subliminal 
primes have a short-lived inﬂ  uence on decision processes that does not con-
tinue beyond a few hundreds of milliseconds; this suggests that active main-
tenance of information is somehow tightly correlated with conscious-level 
processing. Finally, there is evidence that some inferential and/or executive 
processes depend on conscious-level reﬂ  ection. For example, if in a conﬂ  ict 
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can exploit prime information to anticipate an opposite target, this informa-
tion can only inﬂ  uence the decision process when the prime is consciously 
perceived (  Merikle and   Joordens 1997). Conscious-level processing seems 
needed when the decision involves non-automatized changes in high-level pro-
cesses; for instance, the strategic changes that adapt decision parameters such 
as the decision threshold from one trial to the next as a function of perceived 
task difﬁ  culty (the Gratton effect; see   Kunde 2003).
Neural Systems Supporting Conscious and Nonconscious Processing
These observations raise the question of the neurobiological substrate of   con-
scious and nonconscious processing. There is some evidence that conscious 
processing involves large-scale interactions between diverse brain areas, which 
may be evident in synchronized electrophysiological responses detectable on 
the scalp using EEG. Experiments exploiting the phenomenon of   binocular 
rivalry suggest that access to conscious processing is associated with enhanced 
synchronization of neuronal responses (  Fries et al. 1997, 2002;   Tononi et al. 
1998). This notion has received further support by the demonstration that the 
earliest electrographic correlate distinguishing conscious from nonconscious 
processing is a transient increase of precise phase synchronization of oscil-
latory activity in the gamma frequency range across a widely distributed net-
work of cortical areas. This transient phase locking occurs around 180 ms after 
stimulus presentation and appears to be the trigger event gating the access of 
signals to the work space of consciousness (Singer 2007;   Melloni et al. 2007). 
The subsequent transfer and maintenance of consciously processed informa-
tion to working memory is accompanied by sustained oscillatory activity in the 
theta frequency range, again involving a widespread network of cortical areas, 
and by enhanced gamma oscillations during recall (Melloni et al. 2007).   Dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex is thought by many to be a key node for conscious 
processing and is frequently activated or found synchronized with posterior 
areas in fMRI contrasts of conscious/nonconscious processing. Intriguingly, 
electrophysiological markers for conscious processing take approximately 200 
ms to develop and are therefore not evident in ERP components, such as the 
N170 (  Del Cul et al. 2007;   Sergent et al. 2005), but consciously processed 
stimuli lead to an enhanced P300 component which is considered as a cor-
relate of the transfer of information to working memory (  Melloni et al. 2007). 
Later, ERP components can be directly related to reportability using temporal 
accumulation models. Subliminal stimuli may fail to create enough cascading 
activation to activate large-scale circuits in an effective, coherent manner, and 
thus their effects on the decision process may be weaker and restricted to a 
small set of task-related processes.
An important open issue concerns the relation of these observations to 
  top-down attentional control, which evokes similar patterns of neural activ-
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since awareness requires selection of some events or stimuli over others. In 
this context, it is noteworthy that focused attention does not only lead to en-
hanced responses to the selected stimuli but also to an anticipatory entrainment 
of neuronal populations into coherent gamma oscillations (  Fries et al. 2001). 
Despite this covariance, the neural mechanisms underlying attention and con-
sciousness are separable.
Outstanding Questions Regarding Conscious 
and Nonconscious Processing
One question that we pondered was whether consciousness as a process might 
be construed or modeled as a nonconscious decision process to engage or re-
port (Shadlen and   Kiani 2007). Such an analogy might help to explain the ap-
parent consistency between discrimination performance and reportability on a 
trial by trial basis observed in human subjects. This observation suggests that 
the representation of   evidence and its accumulation are intact, whereas the 
policy that guides and implements decision termination is faulty. If conscious 
processing reﬂ  ects an integration process for access to report, then one would 
predict that reportability and discrimination performance curves should be re-
lated by a criterion shift. This model could thus help to provide a description of 
a mechanism that can be linked to the neural correlates of conscious process-
ing. Additional ideas suggest the importance of working memory in conscious 
processing. For example, working memory storage is more efﬁ  cient for con-
sciously perceived stimuli than those that remain subliminal.
One important question is to what degree such conscious processing, and 
its inﬂ  uence on decision making, is conﬁ  ned to humans. Addressing this ques-
tion requires developing behavioral techniques that encourage subjective re-
portability in animals. This has been achieved in studies of binocular rivalry 
(  Logothetis and   Schall 1989) as well as   blindsight (  Cowey and   Stoerig 1991). 
Such evidence supports the notion that some animals may process information 
both consciously and nonconsciously, but it remains to be determined whether 
there are quantitative differences between species or whether these differences 
might be qualitative.
Another relevant question relates to how we can provide a neurobiological 
understanding of the qualia of consciousness. There may be signatures in be-
havior, such as conﬁ  dence ratings, that are measures of qualia. Formal models 
may permit us to determine whether qualia and reportability represent distinct 
aspects of the mechanisms associated with conscious processing.
A ﬁ  nal question relates to the interfering effects of consciousness on deci-
sion making. In general, nonconscious processing is inefﬁ  cient; in   sublimi-
nal priming, for example, only a small subthreshold amount of information is 
available to bias decisions. However, certain tasks, such as swinging a baseball 
bat or searching for the name of the author of a paper from 1967, may be better 
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such tasks to   unconscious processing to solve them more efﬁ  ciently. Under-
standing such nonconscious incubation phenomena and how they eventually 
lead to “aha” moments seems particularly important for understanding creativ-
ity and insight. When people engage in explicit, verbal reﬂ  ection, this interferes 
with ﬁ  nding a solution by insight but does not interfere with solving logical 
problems using analytic techniques. Moreover, explicit, deliberative process-
ing seems particularly disruptive for aesthetic judgments. Such observations 
suggest that conscious and nonconscious processes can be complementary and 
must be actively integrated, yet how these processes differ (what are the pow-
ers and limits of nonconscious processing) and what the neural mechanisms 
underlying these processes are remain to be explored. Further, just how these 
processes are related to habitual systems underlying valuation and decision 
making remains to be determined. 
Accounting for Individual Differences in Decision Making: 
Sources of Heterogeneity in the Decision Process
An important, but unresolved, question is how we can account for differences 
in   decision making between individuals, age groups, neurological conditions, 
and behavioral contexts. Perceptual and economics-based models provide two 
different but complementary approaches to address this issue.
Perceptual and Cognitive Decision Making
At the simplest level, differences in   perceptual   decision making can be usefully 
studied using the diffusion-to-bound model described above. This approach 
has been applied to individual and group differences in a range of experimen-
tal tasks, including   numerosity discrimination, letter discrimination,   brightness 
discrimination,   recognition   memory, and lexical decision. In all tasks except 
letter discrimination, the evidence extracted from stimuli is the same when per-
formed by college students or 60–75 year olds (Ratcliff et al. 2006). In contrast, 
letter discrimination with masking shows a decrease in   evidence accumulation 
with age because older adults progressively lose higher spatial frequency vi-
sion. There is a modest slowing of nondecision components with aging, but the 
main source of longer reaction times is the application of a more conservative 
decision criterion. In some discrimination tasks, model parameters change sys-
tematically with age during childhood (i.e., nondecision components speed up 
and decision criteria are reduced), whereas for other tasks there is a dramatic 
increase in drift rates by age 9 or 10. There is a range of   drift-diffusion model 
parameters expressed in the neurologically intact young adult population.
This style of analysis can also be applied to behavioral changes associated 
with neurological disorders. For example, in lexical decision tasks, patients 
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is impaired relative to neurologically intact individuals. This suggests that the 
representation of evidence and its accumulation are intact, whereas the policy 
that guides and implements decision termination is faulty. Because similar 
models have been successfully applied to studies of the neuronal correlates of 
decision making, this approach shows great promise of directly linking indi-
vidual differences in decision components to the underlying neurobiology.
Social and Economic Decision Making
  Traditionally,   economists have explained heterogeneity in observed behavior 
either through differences in preferences, differences in information sets, or 
the selection of different equilibrium strategies. Neuroscience can help doc-
ument and further explain the sources of these differences, for example, by 
revealing the variances in information-processing strategies, computational 
capacity, or valuation systems. This will be enhanced by directly linking these 
variances to quantiﬁ  able components of the decision architecture revealed in 
neurophysiological studies.
One possible explanation for variance may be due to the heterogeneity of 
  preferences or valuations in the brain. For example, in the   gambling task de-
picted in Figure 6.1, person 1 must choose a or b, against Nature, N. In standard 
theory, we can talk about U(10), U(15), and U(0) as the subjective utility of the 
monetary outcomes 0, 10, and 15. Assume Nature is governed by the follow-
ing random process: play left with probability p and play right with probability 
1 – p. This can then be solved using an expected utility calculation:
U(10) = p* U(15) + (1 – p *) U(0),
where U′ > 0, U′′ < 0, and p* is chosen to give the equality. One reason people 
may show different patterns of choice in this situation (i.e., have different p*) 
is because their preferences, U, may be different. Supporting this notion, para-
metric brain activation correlates of different preferences have been reported 
in the parietal cortex of people playing a gambling task (  Huettel et al. 2006). 
Although the reasons why people might hold different utility function remains 
to be determined fully, it seems likely that genetic background, developmental 
trajectory, and context reactivity contribute to differences in the neural archi-
tecture that supports valuation, emotional responses, evidence accumulation, 
and the decision threshold setting mechanisms outlined above.
A second reason people make different decisions may be because they 
process information differently. In the   voluntary   trust game (Figure 6.2) by 
McCabe and   Smith (2000), player 1 moves left 50% of the time. In response, 
player 2 moves right (reciprocated) 75% of the time in one-shot play. This 
occurs more frequently than predicted by the Nash equilibrium of player 1 al-
ways moving left and player 2 always moving right. For those players moving 
left, their estimated q must have been less than q*, and for those moving right, 
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It is difﬁ  cult to imagine that this strong reciprocity is simply the result of 
differences in   risk aversion, but instead seems more likely to be due to social 
factors. For example, player 1 (who played right) may have thought that this 
would create a social obligation for player 2 to move left—a notion supported 
by behavioral observations in the involuntary trust game (Figure 6.3; McCabe 
et al. 2001). When player 1 is forced to move right and player 2 could not 
see player 1’s foregone opportunity cost, player 2 was twice as likely to play 
right when compared to player 2’s behavior in the voluntary trust game. Fur-
thermore, McCabe et al. (2001) found that cooperators showed signiﬁ  cantly 
greater activation in the   anterior paracingulate cortex when playing other hu-
mans than when playing against a computer. This area has been found to be 
active in numerous fMRI experiments examining   theory-of-mind (  Gallagher 
and   Frith 2003), suggesting social contexts and interactions promote approach 
behavior, engage reward systems in the brain, and encourage empathy and 
social reasoning.
A third reason people vary in their decisions could be due to the use of dif-
ferent strategies in playing the game. Krueger et al. (in preparation) look at 
repeat play of the voluntary trust game played by the same partners who alter-
nated roles between player 1 and player 2. Consistent with earlier behavioral 
ﬁ  ndings, they ﬁ  nd that players can be divided into two types: unconditional 
and conditional cooperators. Intriguingly, these two types of cooperators ex-
hibit different neural signatures in the brain. Thus, individual differences in 
decision making may arise from differences in strategy identiﬁ  ed with distinct 
patterns of neural activity.
Figure 6.1    Gambling task: Choose a or b against Nature (N).
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Figure 6.2  Trust game: Choose a or b against person 2.
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The economic approach to understanding the heterogeneity of decisions 
made by different people or promoted by different contexts provides a tantaliz-
ing hint at the complexity underlying real-world social decisions. Despite the 
attractiveness of this approach, however, considerable questions remain unan-
swered. This reﬂ  ects, in part, the relative maturity of neuroeconomics relative 
to the neurobiology of perceptual decision making. Importantly, although it is 
relatively easy to describe the equilibrium point in a game formally, it seems 
much harder to map this number onto underlying neurobiology. What would an 
equilibrium look like at the neurophysiological level? In social situations, there 
is an explosion of degrees of freedom that all must, ultimately, be reduced to a 
single quantity, the decision variable, in order to inform choice. How could an 
equilibrium be instantiated in a decision variable that is integrated over time to 
a threshold for   commitment?
Extending Neuronal Models of Decision 
Making to Long Temporal Scales
It seems unlikely that simple accumulation models will be able to be extended 
to long timescales, such as decisions over hours or days. Over intermediate 
timescales, a model such as Busemeyer’s decision ﬁ  eld theory may apply 
(  Busemeyer and   Townsend 1993, 1995). For example, in buying a car, one 
may pay attention to different features of the stimulus (e.g., gas mileage, color, 
power). Decision ﬁ  eld theory assumes that these features drive a single deci-
sion process—at each time step, one of the features drives the process towards 
one or the other possible options. Over tens of seconds or a few minutes, this 
seems a reasonable candidate that connects well to established models of per-
ceptual decision making and to our current understanding of the neurophysiol-
ogy in which the decision process is embodied.
However, in tasks that require minutes, hours, or days, (e.g., planning out a 
chess move, deciding whether to go to a conference, and so on), a decision will 
almost certainly involve multiple steps which take some information computed 
as intermediate products that are required by later stages for the ﬁ  nal decision 
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or choice. In addition, intermediate results will have to be stored and retrieved 
when the decision process is interrupted, for example, by boisterous children, 
work, or the television. Because the timescale can be long, behavior will de-
pend on the combinations of the various stages of processing and not so much 
on the individual steps. Of course, in the range of a few seconds, behavior will 
be determined by the distribution of the individual decisions; however, when 
decision times are tens of seconds or longer, the organization of stages will 
then dominate. Connecting long timescale decision processes to the under-
lying neurobiology will require both reasoned computational modeling and 
improved understanding of the neural processes that permit information to be 
accumulated, stored, evaluated, and connected over long delays.
Evolution of Neural Architectures for Decision Making
As   large-brained primates we often neglect the fact that quite complex deci-
sion making can be accomplished by much smaller and differently organized 
nervous systems. There is an enormous richness and complexity of behavior 
that appears to occur without any conscious processing. In fact, one might 
argue that such behaviors are better than conscious; that is, they are highly efﬁ  -
cient, infallible, fast, and exquisitely adapted to a local environment. Although 
many of these behaviors reﬂ  ect the ineluctable releasing of a motor pattern by 
a sign stimulus, many more behaviors appear to rely on ﬂ  exible processes quite 
similar to those guiding behavior in humans and other vertebrates. These ob-
servations raise the important question of whether similar computational rules 
underlie the decision process when it is embodied in dramatically different 
nervous systems.
This complexity is demonstrated aptly by the behavior of the   honeybee 
(Menzel et al. 2007). These diminutive volant insects use the well-known 
waggle dance to communicate navigational information to others in the hive. 
The dance can convey the location of nectar, pollen, resin, water, or a new nest 
site. How other bees interpret these signals varies with the vigor of the dance 
as well as each bee’s current motivational state. Furthermore, the honeybee ap-
pears to interpret different destinations as options that can be weighed in terms 
of evidence bearing on their likelihood or their current value. When a foraging 
bee that has been trained to visit a feeding station is unexpectedly displaced, 
it displays search components in the direction of both the hive and the feeder, 
and ultimately chooses one or the other (Menzel et al. 2005). This behavior 
can be interpreted as each individual bee differentially investing in each of 
the possible options, before selecting one and committing to that action. Even 
more astonishing, bees appear to compute social decisions, in a process akin to 
voting, to choose a new nest site when swarming (  Lindauer 1955).
Presently, we know little about how these processes are encoded in the 
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system, the octopamine system, which apparently serves a similar role in value 
learning (Menzel and   Giurfa 2001). How this valuation system might inﬂ  uence 
valuation and decision processes carried out elsewhere in the bee brain remains 
to be studied. One clue to the design of the neural architecture supporting val-
ue-based decisions in both vertebrates and invertebrates is that neuromodula-
tory systems such as dopamine and octopamine project widely and appear to 
broadcast a message related to values and emotions of a single class (e.g., 
appetitive, aversive;   Schultz and   Dickinson 2000). Similar principles charac-
terize the serotonergic, cholinergic, and norepinephrine systems, which appear 
to promote changes in the value of different options or behavioral strategies. 
In this scheme, the message computed by any individual neuron may change 
with respect to the weighting of inputs and channeling of outputs by altering 
modulatory states. Future progress in understanding the principles governing 
decision making and how the decision process is embodied in large networks 
of neurons in humans and other vertebrates will proﬁ  t from an understanding 
of how decision making is accomplished by a limited number of highly spe-
cialized neurons in the invertebrate nervous system (Menzel and   Giurfa 2006). 
In particular, one may ask whether the computational role of individual neu-
rons embedded in their anatomical and functional network may change with 
modulatory states and expected outcomes.
Extending Neuronal Models of Decision Making 
to Legal Issues and Group Processes
Can an understanding of the   neurobiology of decision making have clear im-
plications for decision making at the group or institutional level?
  Institutions are humanly devised formal (rules, laws, constitutions) or in-
formal (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct) 
constraints that govern the behavior of two or more individuals (  North 1990). 
These constraints deﬁ  ne the incentive structure of societies and, speciﬁ  cally, 
economies. Institutions are a central concern for law, which serves as the for-
mal regime for political rule making and enforcement. In general, understand-
ing the neurobiology of decision making could be important for understanding 
how institutions have evolved over time (see   McElreath et al., this volume), as 
well as how institutions impact human decision making (e.g., judge and jury 
decision making) and behavior (see   Lubell et al., this volume). At the present 
time, it is not possible to state whether neurobiology can ultimately help us 
reach a better understanding of institutional decision making. However, in the 
following sections, we explore current neuroscientiﬁ  c data and their potential 
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Evolution and Formulation of Institutions and 
Neural Models of Decision Making
Although institutions may be deliberately and intentionally formulated by 
people, the evolution and function of institutions might be better understood as 
emergent phenomena. In other words,   institutions evolve and operate in a fash-
ion that cannot be predicted from the decisions made by any single individual. 
If institutions are truly emergent, this raises the important questions of what 
we can learn from neurobiological or behavioral studies in animals to explain 
how institutions have evolved (see   McElreath et al., this volume) and whether 
neurobiology can inform the formulation of rules by political and legal institu-
tions to promote desired social behavior.
These questions have begun to be addressed explicitly in the realm of public 
policy. As we have discussed in this report,   motivation and   emotion contribute 
in important ways to   decision making; thus, understanding how the cognitive 
control of motivation and emotion is implemented in the brain might provide 
important insights for institutional decision making. If, for example, a soci-
ety wishes to regulate a particular form of undesirable behavior, knowledge 
of the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive control may provide impor-
tant insights in developing legal rules to achieve this goal.   Ochsner and   Gross 
(2005), for example, have proposed that cognitive control of emotional states 
requires both attentional selection of information and cognitive modulation 
of emotional processes; that is, processes which appear to be implemented by 
distinct neural systems. To the extent that this model provides an accurate de-
scription of the neurobiology of cognitive control, different types of legal rules 
might be developed to engage these different systems differentially in order to 
attain desirable goals. In a similar vein,   Bernheim and   Rangel (2004) recently 
applied current understanding of the neurobiology of addiction to the formula-
tion of better economic policies on addictive substances. These models suggest 
that neurobiological understanding, when thoughtfully applied, may positively 
inform public policy making.
Legal Decision Making and Neural Models of Decision Making
 Understanding  the neuronal correlates of decision making may also impact how 
we address the problem of determining culpability and setting standards of pun-
ishment in the legal system. Clearly, people’s actions (i.e., the outcome of their 
decisions) are determined by processes that occur in their brains. This obvious 
fact raises the troubling question of whether we are responsible for our actions, 
and it has clear implications for attributing agency and assigning punishment.
The problem can be illustrated by the difference in   culpability one would 
ascribe to a defendant who impulsively acts out his aggression against another 
person due to a large brain tumor in the medial prefrontal cortex. In this case, 150  M. Platt et al. 
most people would not hold the defendant responsible for his actions. Contrast 
this situation with a defendant who commits the same act due to a nonobvi-
ous change in neural circuitry as a result of environmental or physiological 
deﬁ  cits that arose during development, subliminal brain injury, or genetic fac-
tors. Whether this defendant should be treated any differently under the law 
than the defendant with the obvious brain tumor is a highly contentious and 
hotly debated issue. Yet, as evidence accumulates favoring the idea that brain 
states reﬂ  ect the interaction of genes and environmental inﬂ  uences during de-
velopment, which means they are thus out of the control of the individual, this 
legal problem will become thornier indeed. Witness the interaction between 
the expression of different genetic variants involved in neuromodulatory func-
tion (e.g., monoamine oxidase A, serotonin transporter gene), developmental 
stress, and likelihood of being incarcerated for violence (  Caspi et al. 2002).
It is perhaps worth considering the various goals of the   legal system in this 
regard. If the goal is to mitigate the risk of recidivism, then scientiﬁ  c evidence 
supporting a clear relationship between broken connections among genes, 
brains, and appropriate action should play an important role in the legal pro-
cess. If the goal of the legal system is, however, to determine moral agency 
and thus culpability for antisocial behaviors (perhaps to deter such behaviors 
in the society) absent of preventing future illegal behavior, then the utility of 
neuroscientiﬁ  c evidence becomes less clear. Current models of perceptual- and 
value-based decision making may help guide the assessment of neuroscientiﬁ  c 
evidence favoring a link between genes, development, brain states, and action. 
Yet even as neuroscience begins to explain the mental capacities that underlie 
agency, motivation, and initiative—and hence responsibility and   free will—it 
does not explain away these phenomena. Insights from neurobiology may aug-
ment the discussion of such legal concepts as negligence, but it should not 
override traditional approaches.
Conclusions
Neurobiologists now understand, in great detail, how simple decisions are 
made by individual neurons and groups of neurons in several well-deﬁ  ned ex-
perimental contexts. This understanding has proceeded from the simultaneous 
application of formal computational models to both behavior and the activity 
patterns of individual neurons. This achievement was unthinkable ﬁ  fty years 
ago, and thus we should feel optimistic that even more progress will be made 
over the next half century. Despite this optimism, signiﬁ  cant challenges remain. 
Most importantly, a wide gulf remains between the simple decisions typically 
studied in the laboratory and the complex decisions made in the real world. 
Bridging this gap will require concerted integration across multiple disciplines 
and levels of analysis. This has already begun in the ﬁ  elds of neuroscience, 
psychology, and economics, but only a brave few have crossed the chasms   Neuronal Correlates of Decision Making   151
separating these ﬁ   elds from anthropology, evolutionary biology, political 
science, and the law. Equally important to dispel natural fears of a brave new 
world of biological determinism and moral ambiguity, our boldness in crossing 
these boundaries must be bolstered by the quality of our science and the care 
with which our conclusions are communicated to the wider community.
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